Introduction
Diversified business groups are deeply rooted in the social and economic life of most emerging economies. A vast array of field surveys indicate that groups -so called grupos in Latin America, business houses in India, chaebol in South Korea, holding companies in Turkey, and others elsewhere -are ubiquitous in emerging economies. Vigorous academic discourse about this organisational form is ongoing with several scholars offering a range of motives for the existence of business groups. A growing body of empirical work, set in a range of emerging markets, shows that group affiliation has a robustly large and often beneficial effect on the financial performance of member firms (Keister, 1988; Khanna and Rivkin, 1999; Khanna and Palepu, 2000a, b) .
Building on the prior literature, we focus our attention on Turkish business groups. Turkey offers an interesting experimental setting for several reasons. First, from the early 1980s, Turkey has made major changes in its economic polices, which resulted in significant deregulation of product and capital markets leading to increased domestic and international competition. Second, prior to these economic changes, Turkey's private sector was dominated by large diversified business groups. These groups should therefore make significant changes in their scope and structure in response to the policy changes. Third, as in the case of other emerging markets, Turkish firms tend to have higher ownership concentration than do US and European counterparts. Further, the market for corporate control is not as developed as that in the USA and Europe, and hence the disciplinary role of outside blockholders may not be obvious. Turkish companies traditionally rely on bank debt and equity to finance investments. The corporate bond market in Turkey is very small and thin. Finally, firms in Turkish business groups are tied by common ownership of a significant block of shares in group companies, often by a family or by the holding itself. These group firms are legally separate entities; have their own shareholders; and publish their own statements. In contrast to the keiretsu firms in Japan, no group-specific bank is assigned to coordinate group activities though most holding companies have their own bank. Instead, the coordination of actions among group members is orchestrated through the main holding company, common board members and the involvement of a family in each group.
Despite the apparent growth in the number of academic studies concerning business groups in emerging economies, there is a paucity of information and study relating to the role of group affiliation on corporate performance in Turkey. The purpose of this study is essentially to compare the performance of group affiliated firms with the performance of independent firms. We also compare the characteristics of the group affiliated firms and the independent firms using financial ratios.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section provides a brief review of the previous literature on the relationship between group affiliation and corporate performance. The data set and methodology are presented in the third section. After a section on research results, conclusions are set out in the final section.
Literature review
Most of the research examining the role of group affiliation has focused on two leading Asian economies, Japan and Korea, as it is envisaged that group affiliation of firms plays a vital role in their economic development. These studies mainly investigated the role of keiretsu or chaebol affiliation on firm behavior. For example, Nakatani (1984) noted that for the period of 1971-1982, profits were generally lower for group-affiliated firms in the Japanese manufacturing sector, whereas average employee compensation and the debt-equity ratio were higher. He concluded that the formation of groups has served the purpose of stabilizing corporate performance over time at the cost of sacrificing the level of corporate performance.
Drawing on the data for large manufacturing firms for the period of 1961 -1970 , Caves and Uekusa (1976 indicated that profits were, if anything, negatively related to group affiliation, though the variation in profits was somewhat smaller for group-affiliated firms. Cable and Yasuki (1985) also found no significant relationship between profits and group affiliation for large Japanese firms. While these studies do not rely on the assumptions of profit maximization and the relevant transactioncost explanation of group affiliation, they may fit into an alternative explanation that diversification through group affiliation reduces risk and thus leads to lower profits reflecting the reduced risk.
On the other hand, based on the assumptions of the transaction cost model, Chang and Choi (1988) showed that unlike recent studies on Japanese firms, groupaffiliated Korean manufacturing firms had higher profits than independent firms in which transactions-costs are higher for non-affiliated firms due to market imperfections. In a recent study, Choi and Cowing (1999) noted that Korean chaebols over the period [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] significantly recorded lower annual profits than non-group affiliated firms, although they found some evidence that this difference has declined over time.
There are several reasons to posit that group affiliation is potentially beneficial in an emerging market context. One possible answer is provided by the transaction cost model, which postulates that firms attempt to avoid the higher transactions-cost involved in external transactions due to market imperfections through the use of more extensive intragroup transactions. In emerging markets, there are a variety of market failures caused by information and agency problems. For instance, the financial markets are characterised by inadequate disclosure and weak corporate governance and control. Most of the intermediaries are not fully evolved. Securities regulations are generally weak and their enforcement is erratic. Similar problems abound in product and labour markets. However, economic development is likely to reduce the extent of market imperfections, making this argument problematic for more recent periods.
The second explanation lies in the attempt to reduce firms' risk through group affiliation with a highly diversified business group. Turkish business groups are highly diversified across several industries including food, electronics, automobiles, construction equipment, chemicals, retailing and financial services. While such market diversification reduces risk across the group, group affiliation may simply be considered as a means of reducing risk for member firms. At the firm level, this would show up in the form of lower profits due to the related financial trade-off between risk and profits. Third, possible agency problems that allow firm managers to pursue goals other than those consistent with the owners' interests may also provide an explanation to perceived benefits of group affiliation in emerging economies. However, the ownership structure of Turkish business groups is not likely to offer agency problems, as they are highly controlled by either individuals or families. Given the highly centralised nature of this control, it is unlikely that substantial differences between owner and managerial interests can arise to any significant degree.
Methodology
The data set consists of all non-group and group-affiliated Turkish non-financial private sector firms listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) as of the end of 1999. Our sample includes 202 non-financial corporations and excludes banks, leasing companies, investment companies, holding companies and insurance firms. The data for our study are obtained from a publicly available database maintained by ISE (1999) and monthly bulletins of ISE.
The sample includes 84 group affiliated firms and 118 independent firms. A business group is defined as having group members operating in more than two industries where each industry is assigned a two-digit SIC code. We also define family and foreign (including full and shared owneship) ownership structures as alternative ownership variables. Our sample includes 74 familyowned and 128 non-family-owned firms and 34 foreign-owned and 168 non-foreignowned firms. In the analysis, ownership variables are denoted as dummy variables.
We use stock market and accounting measures of performance to determine the effects of group membership. We construct a proxy for a Tobin's q, defined as [(book value of total assets -book value of equity + market value of equity)/book value of total assets]. Our second important performance measure is the firm's return on assets. In addition to these widely used measures, we adopt return on equity, profit margin, price/earnings ratio, price/cash flow ratio and price/book value ratio as other relevant performance variables. We also use another ROA(1), defined as (net income + interest * (1-tax rate))/total assets) as used by Khanna and Palepu (2000b) . Apart from accounting and stock market measures of performance variables, the variables used in the study as various measures of the firms' financial characteristics are presented in Table I . These variables include short and long term solvency ratios and asset management/activity ratios.
We also employ control variables to account for differences in firm size and sectoral breakdown. Firm size consists of small, medium and large firms measured by median value of asset size. In terms of sectoral breakdown, seven sectors are identified, including food and beverages, textile, apparel, chemicals, petroleum and rubber, cement, stone and glass, industrial, electrical machinery and electronics, trade and services, and others.
Results
The one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used to analyse the effect of group scope and to compare the financial characteristics of group affiliated and independent firms. The non-parametric equivalent of the above test (the Kruskal-Wallis Test) was also conducted to remove any doubts that may stem from the nature of the data. The non-parametric tests (not reported here) confirm the findings of the parametric tests. Results in Tables II and  III suggest that affiliation with a business group is marginally significant for return on assets (p < 0.1), and is moderately significant for the adopted version of return on assets ROA(1) (p < 0.05). However, with respect to other accounting and stock market measures of the performance, the firms do not differ significantly across group vs non-group and family vs non-family ownership categories. Moreover, the return on assets ratio of foreign owned firms are significantly higher than that of non-foreign-owned firms (p < 0.01). This significant relationship does not exist for other performance measures and also casts doubt on the results, since firm size and sectoral breakdown are significant in general for most of the performance measures. As a robustness check, we have also run a multiple regression analysis to investigate further the relationship between firm performance and group membership, after controlling for a number of firm characteristics such as firm size, age and industry affiliation and using ROA, ROA(1) and Tobin's q as dependent variables. Our findings, however, indicated no significant relationship between group affiliation and firm performance (p > 0.1), which contradicts the findings of Khanna and Palepu (2000a, b) .
Our findings, however, tend to support the findings of an earlier study by Aydogan and Gursoy (1999) . Drawing on a sample of 145 non-financial companies listed on ISE as of 
Stock market performance measures
Price/earnings ratio (P/E) (Market value/net income) Price/cash flow ratio (P/CF) (Market value/(net income + depreciation)) Price/book value ratio (P/BV) (Market valu/equity) Tobin's q ((Book value of total assets ± book value of equity + market value of equity)/book value of total assets)
Short-and long-term solvency ratios Liquidity ratios Current ratio (Current assets/current liabilities) Quick ratio ((Current assets-inventories)/ current liabilities) Financial leverage
Total debt ratio (Total debt/total assets) Long term debt ratio (Long-term debt/common equity)
Asset management/activity ratios Days, sales in Inventory (Number of days in year/(cost of goods sold/inventory)) Days, sales in receivables (Number of days in year/(sales/accounts receivables)) Total assets turnover (Net sales/total assets) Fixed assets turnover (Net sales/total assets) Extent of internationalization (Foreign sales/total sales) Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed) the end of 1995, they investigated the existence of a relationship between equity ownership structure and firm performance but also found no significant relationship. These findings maight be explained by the nature of the sample, which includes only the largest publicly traded companies because large domestic companies with no conglomerate affiliation are not handicapped in terms of access to capital markets or procurement of projects, government incentives, and qualified labor. Another reason might stem from the fact that ROA suffers from business cycles and does not consider differences in systematic risk and is not forward looking (Benston, 1985) . In addition, while Tobin's q as a performance measure mitigates some of the problems ROA causes, caution has to be exercised when interpreting the results given the illiquidity and ultimately disclosure problems of the Turkish capital market. The ANOVA statistics with short and long term solvency characteristics are presented in Table IV . The results indicate that the liquidity ratios do not differ across any form of ownership categories. This might result from the high inflationary economic environment in Turkey, as it discourages firms from holding cash items in their portfolio.
Of the financial leverage ratios, only total debt ratio is found significantly different (p < 0.01) between family-owned and non-family-owned firms, with the total debt ratio of family-owned firms being significantly higher than that of non-family-owned firms. Similarly, compared to foreign-owned firms, firms with local capital also have higher debt ratios (p < 0.1) as they tend to finance themselves mainly from external resources instead of using internal capital. The amount of debt also varies significantly across different sectors (p < 0.05).
The ANOVA statistics with the asset management/activity characteristics are shown in Table V . The results indicate that both days' sales in inventory and days' sales in receivables significantly vary with group affiliation (p < 0.05). Moreover, the fixed assets turnover characteristic differs with respect to the family ownership variable. These results indicate that the routine business turnover activity patterns are different for some of the ownership categories. In terms of the extent of internationalisation, the non-group firms significantly differ from the group affiliates Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed) Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed) Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed) (p < 0.01). This finding is not particularly surprising, since a relatively great proportion of non-group firms seems to be export oriented companies, while group firms enjoy the benefit of controlling the domestic market. On the other hand, family-owned companies have a significantly larger internationalisation ratio than that of non-family groups. These results show that relatively small family firms try to grow by selling products abroad. In addition, industrial differences usually matter in regard to asset management/activity ratios, while asset size becomes significant only for days' sales in receivables.
Summary and conclusions
In a cross-sectional study of non-financial firms listed in Istanbul Stock Exchange, we have attempted to delineate the financial characteristics of group affiliated and independent firms with particular emphasis on the relationship between group affiliation and corporate performance. We have noted that firms affiliated with diversified Turkish business groups do not differ significantly from unaffiliated focused firms in terms of accounting and stock market measures of performance. Moreover, our findings indicate that the performance measures of familyowned firms are not different from those of non-family-owned firms. Results also suggest that foreign-owned firms perform significantly better than domestic firms in terms of return on assets, but not in terms of other performance measures.
The findings indicate that the measures of stock market performance do not posit any significant relationship across different ownership variables. This may be partly related to the market inefficiency of Istanbul Stock Exchange given its small and thin characteristics and the disclosure problems of the Turkish capital market. Stock prices therefore may not appropriately reflect the benefits and the costs of diversification.
Comparison of financial characteristics among ownership variables reveals that while group affiliation is related to days' sales in inventory and days' sales in receivables ratios, and also to the extent of internationalisation, both group affiliated and independent firms have similar liquidity, financial leverage, total assets turnover and fixed asset turnover ratios. Furthermore, family-owned firms have higher total debt, fixed asset turnover and greater extent of diversification ratios than non-family-owned firms. In regard to shortand long-term solvency and asset management/activity ratios, foreign-owned and domestic firms have similar characteristics except for total debt ratio where domestic firms have higher debt financing than foreign-owned firms.
More research in this subject is clearly called for. A longitudinal study of diversified business groups in Turkey would be a valuable area for future research. Another avenue for future research in Turkey would be an analysis of the relationship between the extent of group diversification and firm performance. Finally, the sources of costs and benefits of group affiliation would certainly be a useful addition to the literature.
